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A GLOWING PROBLEM: NORTH COUNTY ST. LOUIS AND
NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Kevin Kamps, a nuclear waste activist, referred to
the United States’ current waste storage strategies as the “single greatest
security vulnerability in the United States.”1 While his statement may
seem like hyperbole, there is the very real question of what threats nuclear
waste poses in Kamps’ mind that justifies referring to it as such a threat
repetitive. As nuclear waste spreads into Coldwater Creek from the West
Lake Landfill in North St. Louis County (“North County”), the citizens of
North County are experiencing a spike in cancer rates. The people of
North County are certain that the cancer rates are due to the failure of a
former nuclear refinery storing high-level radioactive waste in
unacceptable conditions. If the improper storing of high-level radioactive
waste is the cause of these cancer rates, it’s critical to discover who was
responsible for monitoring waste storage when the waste was spilled.

Steve Hargreaves, Nuclear Waste: America’s ‘biggest security threat’, CNN MONEY
(Apr. 1, 2011). http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/01/news/economy/nuclear_waste/.
1
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More importantly, who is responsible for monitoring waste storage now,
and what can they do to prevent this kind of contamination in the future?
II. A GROWING PROBLEM IN NORTH COUNTY
Twenty miles north of St. Louis, you can find the town of
Bridgeton.2 In the summer, you will see the community gathering together
for fireworks displays on the Fourth of July,3 and in the winter you can
attend the local pancake breakfast with Santa.4 In these and other ways,
Bridgeton is like any other small town you will find across Missouri. The
major difference between Bridgeton and other Missouri towns is the West
Lake landfill.5 While most landfills are filled with the refuse of modern
life, the West Lake landfill contains an inordinate amount of hazardous
nuclear waste left over from World War II.6

Missouri Department of
Transportationhttp://www.modot.org/newsandinfo/documents/countymaps/st_louis.pdf
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
3
Special Events, CITY OF BRIDGETON MISSOURI.
http://www.bridgetonmo.com/departments/parks-and-recreation/programsactivities/special-events.
4
City of Bridgeton Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 2016 Fall Activity Guide,
http://www.bridgetonmo.com/home/showdocument?id=1594.
5
Jeffery Tomic, EPA Weighs Cleanup of Nuclear Waste at Bridgeton Landfill, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/epa-weighscleanup-of-nuclear-waste-at-bridgeton-landfill/article_452f82ac-6d57-11e1-93000019bb30f31a.html.
6
Blythe Bernhard, State Now Asks for Inquiry into North County Cancers, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Sep. 23, 2014) http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med2
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The origin of the nuclear waste in the West Lake landfill stretches
back to the creation of the first atom bomb.7 The Ireland-based company
Mallinckrodt Chemical Inc. (“Mallinckrodt”) had one of its headquarters
in St. Louis, Missouri during the height of the United States’ nuclear
testing.8 Mallinckrodt signed a contract with the U.S. War Department9 to
provide uranium to the University of Chicago’s graphite reactor. 10 This
relationship evolved into Mallinckrodt providing uranium processing and
waste management for the United States’ first attempts at producing
atomic weapons.11 Mallinckrodt was the only producer of uranium
contracted with the federal government when the Manhattan Project
initially began, so Mallinckrodt provided high purity uranium and handled
the resulting waste.12 70 years after the completion of the Manhattan
Project, Mallinckrodt’s relationship with the federal government

fit/health/state-now-asks-for-inquiry-into-north-county-cancers/article_f2de6a33-f4825d2a-9797-b7dd2f662ce1.html.
7
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (hereafter “NRC”), Mallinckrodt Chemical Inc.
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/complex/mallinckrodt-chemical-incfacility.html (last updated June 26, 2015).
8
Id.
9
STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, The National Security Act of 1947– 26 July 1947, A New
Structure for National Security Policy Planning, 228-32 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS1998).
10
NRC, supra note 7.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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continued, and Mallinckrodt purified 45 million kilograms’ worth of
uranium products.13 Mallinckrodt produced reactor fuel rods from 1956 to
1961, which contributed to some of the country’s first nuclear reactors.14
Mallinckrodt continued production of nuclear material, such as C-T and
thorium salt, until 1993, when its license to handle nuclear materials was
limited to decommissioning.15
After the 1993 decommissioning license was issued, discussions
began about where to dispose of Mallinckrodt’s more than half a century’s
worth of nuclear waste.16 The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”) oversaw the use of the Mississippi River, the only
surface water near the Mallinckrodt facility, as the method of eliminating
the nuclear waste.17 However, decommissioning through the Mississippi
River did not happen fast enough, and the surfaces, structures, and soil at
the Mallinckrodt site became contaminated by the radioactive material.18
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ( “Corps”), with oversight by
Keith Schneider, Mountain of Nuclear Waste Splits St. Louis and Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 1990). http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/24/us/mountain-of-nuclear-wastesplits-st-louis-and-suburbs-888.html.
14
NRC, supra note 7.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Bernhard, supra note 6.
13
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the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), was
assigned to remove the contamination at the Mallinckrodt facilities.19 The
Corps’ removal of the contamination came in two phases.20 Phase I
involved

the

decommissioning

of

contaminated

equipment

and

structures.21 Phase II involves decommissioning building slabs and
foundations, paved surfaces, and all subsurface materials. While Phase I
finished in December 2004, Phase II is ongoing.22
While these operations to decontaminate the area around the
Mallinckrodt facility are in progress, little has been done for the areas
around St. Louis County where Mallinckrodt had secretly dumped tons of
nuclear waste.23 One such dumping site was the West Lake landfill.24
Another location, Coldwater Creek, was contaminated as well. 25 The

NRC, supra note 7.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Steven Hsieh, St. Louis Is Burning, ROLLING STONE (May 10, 2013),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/st-louis-is-burning-20130510.
24
Id.
25
Schneider, supra at note 13. (“Until 1966, Mallinckrodt processed uranium for nuclear
weapons at its main plant along the Mississippi River in downtown St. Louis and in
Weldon Spring, 25 miles to the west. Under the cover of national security secrecy, the
Government authorized the company to dump radioactive wastes quietly in the suburbs,
including a 21-acre Berkeley field owned by St. Louis. It is that field and the 61-acre park
across the street that the Government is considering for a permanent storage site.”).
19
20
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Corps has begun a cleanup project at Coldwater Creek,26 and, in 2008, the
EPA announced a plan to clean up the West Lake landfill.27
The health and safety of the people of Bridgeton and all of North
St. Louis County are relying on the EPA’s cleanup plans. Unfortunately,
in 2012, four years after the announcement of the EPA’s plan, the cleanup
still has not remedied the issue of nuclear waste contamination around the
West Lake landfill.28 The people in North St. Louis County began noticing
the prevalence of cancer among the residents of the North County. 29 A
2013 investigation by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior
Services determined that the cancer rates were not anomalous, and were
not likely linked to the radiation in the area.30 The report was criticized by
citizens of North County for flaws in methodology, including failing to

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program,
http://www.mvs.usace.army.mil/Missions/CentersofExpertise/FormerlyUtilizedSitesRem
edialActionProgram.aspx.
27
Tomic, supra note 5.
28
Id.
29
Blythe Bernhard, North St. Louis County Cancer Report Called Flawed, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/north-stlouis-county-cancer-report-called-flawed/article_0e66e0ab-b25a-5a37-a2ae276dd2073693.html.
30
Shumei Yun, et al., MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERV., Analysis of Cancer
Incidence Data in Coldwater Creek Area, 1996-2004 (Mar. 2013),
http://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/chronic/cancerinquiry/pdf/ccanalysis.pdf.
26
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account for people who had moved away from North St. Louis County.31
After much demand, a subsequent investigation was conducted in 2015,
which showed that there were statistically significant increases in
leukemia, breast, colon, brain, and other cancer rates in areas around
Coldwater Creek and Bridgeton.32 The Missouri Department of Health and
Senior Services is now requesting assistance from the Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) in determining if the nuclear waste caused the increased
cancer rates.33
Numerous residents of North County have initiated lawsuits
against Mallinckrodt for dumping the nuclear waste in Coldwater Creek
and the West Lake landfill.34 Mallinckrodt responded to these lawsuits by

Bernhard, supra note 29.
Shumei Yun, et al., MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERV., Analysis of Cancer
Incidence Data in Eight ZIP Code Areas Around Coldwater Creek, 1996-2011 (Sep.
2014),
http://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/chronic/cancerinquiry/pdf/ccanalysisSept20
14.pdf
33
Bernhard, supra note 6.
34
Blythe Bernhard, Another Lawsuit Claims Cancers Caused by Coldwater Creek in
North St. Louis County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sep. 8, 2014)
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/health/another-lawsuit-claims-cancerscaused-by-coldwater-creek-in-north/article_d3931a27-7520-5ad2-bf17583c0a19c049.html; see also Blythe Bernhard, North St. Louis County Group Files 2nd
Suit Alleging Nuclear Waste Caused Illness, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 11, 2012)
http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/fitness/north-st-louis-county-groupfiles-nd-suit-alleging-nuclear/article_1dc41bd3-b72a-5736-abe5-3609f8288d74.html; see
also Blythe Bernhard, Judge Throws Out Most Coldwater Creek Cancer Claims, ST.
31
32
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saying that the business was complying with federal law when disposing
of the nuclear waste.35
III. HISTORY OF REGULATORY LAWS REGARDING NUCLEAR WASTE
A.

State Nuclear Waste Law

Missouri lacks laws and regulations regarding the disposal of solid
nuclear waste. The only law regarding hazardous waste in Missouri is the
Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law (“Waste Law”).36 The
topics covered by the Waste Law range from required licensing for
hazardous waste transporters37 to the establishment of taxes on waste
entering landfills.38 However, Section 260.355.1 of the Waste Law makes
it clear that Missouri does not intend to regulate high-level radioactive
waste.39 Specifically, the section specifies that the Waste Law applies to
waste except for a few categories, including “[r]adioactive wastes

LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 29, 2013) http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-medfit/health/judge-throws-out-most-coldwater-creek-cancer-claims/article_1101cc0c-7185534f-89ff-870a322ff042.html (Claims for injuries relating to nuclear materials was not
dismissed).
35
Id.
36
MO. REV. STAT. § 250.350.1 (2000).
37
§ 260.385.1.
38
§ 260.390.1.
39
§ 260.355.1.
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regulated under section 2011, et seq., of title 42 of United States Code.”40
The relevant federal statute regulates “high-level” radioactive waste,41
which is defined as “the highly radioactive material resulting from the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced
directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid
waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations,” as well
as “other highly radioactive material that the [Nuclear Regulatory]
Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires
permanent isolation.”42 While this definition makes it clear that Missouri
has no intention to deal with high-level radioactive waste, it suggests that
Missouri’s Waste Law does cover low-level radioactive waste.
Missouri is willing to regulate “low-level” radioactive waste as
defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”) identifies low-level waste as objects that are
tangential to the processing of nuclear material, rather than the runoff of
the fission material itself.43 The NRC identified examples of such “low-

§ 260.355.1 (1).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b)(dd)-(gg)(2012).
42
§ 10101.
43
NRC, Low-Level Waste (Last Updated Jun. 21, 2016). http://www.nrc.gov/waste/low40
41
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level” waste materials as “contaminated protective shoe covers and
clothing, wiping rags, … syringes, and laboratory animal carcasses and
tissues.”44 To control these materials, the Waste Law created the
Hazardous Waste Management Commission of the State of Missouri
(“Commission”).45 The Commission has the power to impose inspection
schedules on hazardous waste production facilities, as well as to establish
a tax on any facilities that are required to receive hazardous waste and the
facilities that generate the waste.46 The Commission can also establish
regulations on the storage, treatment, and disposal of low-level radioactive
hazardous wastes.47
However, none of these regulations affects high-level radioactive
material, such as the waste produced by Mallinckrodt, because Missouri
has no laws regulating high-level radioactive waste. However, this lack of
regulation is not uncommon amongst the states.48 Most states have laws
either admonishing certain actions, or laws used to review federal

level-waste.html.
44
Id.
45
MO. REV. STAT. § 260.365.1 (2000).
46
§ 260.370.1; see also. § 260.380.1.
47
§§ 260.370(2), (3)(b), (g); see also §§ 260.380(4), (7).
48
S. Haber, State Nuclear Legislative Report, ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., (1981).
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recommendations.49 This lack of regulation of high-level radioactive waste
is due, in part, to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 50
B.

Federal Nuclear Waste Law Prior to 1974

The first major federal law covering nuclear waste was the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 (“the Act”). The legislation was developed after
Manhattan Project participants called for a comprehensive nuclear energy
program that referenced the military, scientific, and industrial uses of
nuclear energy.51 After significant revision and debate about the threat of
nuclear weapon technology leaking out of the United States, President
Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 on August 1,
1946.52 This new legislation gave broad power to the federal government
regarding the ownership and development of nuclear technology.53
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the Atomic Energy
Commission in order to develop regulations and make determinations of
Id.
James Nuse, Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress), AEC
HEADQUARTERS LIBRARY
http://science.energy.gov/~/media/bes/pdf/Atomic_Energy_Act_of_1946.pdf (This is a
selected excerpt of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, including its
relevant provisions).
51
RICHARD HEWLETT & OSCAR ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION: THE NEW WORLD, 1939/1946 VOL. 1. 410 (1962).
52
VINCENT JAMES, MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND THE ATOMIC BOMB 578 (1985).
53
Hewlett & Anderson, supra note 51.
49
50
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federal law regarding how nuclear power ought to be handled.54 The Act
gave the Atomic Energy Commission sole power to authorize and make
arrangements for the research and development of any process relating to
nuclear processes, even those relating to protecting the health of
individuals during research and production.55 Most interestingly, the
Atomic Energy Act made all nuclear fission materials within the United
States the property of the federal government. 56 Additionally, Section 9 of
the Act gave the Atomic Energy Commission ownership of all property
rights the federal government had in any nuclear materials.57 The Atomic
Energy Commission was given full control over dissemination of all
nuclear materials and any information relating to production of nuclear
energy.58
In the years following the signing of the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, the Atomic Energy Commission retained control over all things
regarding nuclear energy. Laws subsequent to the 1946 Act established
that states had the ability to enter into agreements with the Commission
Nuse, supra note 50, at § 2.
Id. at § 4.
56
Id. at § 5.
57
Id. at §. 9.
58
Id. at §§ 10–12.
54
55
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regarding a limited set of subjects.59 However, no agreement could remove
the authority of the Commission regarding disposal of any nuclear
material or byproduct thereof.60 Later laws even required states to dispose
of low-level radioactive waste themselves.61 Through all of this, control
over high-level radioactive waste and materials remained in the hands of
the Atomic Energy Commission.62
C.
Federal Nuclear Waste Law After 1974: The Birth of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Criticism of the Atomic Energy Commission grew leading into the
creation of the Energy Reorganization Act.63 The Atomic Energy
Commission was accused of being negligent while performing
atmospheric testing, causing numerous individuals living near the testing
areas to develop health problems.64 By the 1960s, atmospheric testing,
such as the tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, left the
world in a damaged state.65 From small St. Louis County towns to

42 U.S.C. § 2021 (2012).
§ 2021(c).
61
Id.
62
Nuse, supra note 50.
63
GLENN SEABORG, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION UNDER NIXON 115 (1993).
64
Id.
65
Steven Simon, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer Risks, AMERICAN
SCIENTIST (last visited Nov. 28, 2016),
59
60

87

Antarctica, soil, water, and polar ice showed signs of atmospheric nuclear
testing.66 Citizens blamed the Atomic Energy Commission for creating
what they viewed as a nuclear fallout from the Atomic Energy
Commission’s atmospheric testing.67
The actions of the Atomic Energy Commission prompted a
legislative response in the form of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974.68 Section 104 of the Energy Reorganization Act officially abolished
the Atomic Energy Commission.69 All of the funds and many of the
powers of the Commission were transferred to the Energy Research and
Development Administration.70 The Energy Reorganization Act also
created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”).71 Rather than being
given a wide grant of power of the handling of nuclear material, the NRC
was required to establish four offices for handling specific issues

http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/pub/fallout-from-nuclear-weapons-tests-andcancer-risks.
66
Id.
67
Seaborg, supra note 63.
68
NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Legislation 112th Congress; 2nd Session (Last Visited Apr.
10, 2016) § 2 http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A489.pdf#page=241.
69
Id. at § 104.
70
Id.
71
Id. at § 201.
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regarding nuclear technology.72 The NRC consists of five individuals, one
of whom serves as the Chairman when selected to do so by the President
of the United States.73 The four remaining members of the NRC direct
these four different offices.74
One NRC office was responsible for licensing nuclear research
facilities, high-level radioactive waste storage facilities, and nuclear
reactor facilities.75 Another NRC office handles nuclear regulatory
research, much like the Atomic Energy Commission handled nuclear
research.76 However, rather than being able to research any topic regarding
nuclear power, the NRC is limited to research “which the Commission
deems necessary for the performance of its licensing and related
regulatory functions.”77 While this limitation still gives the Commission
the ability to determine what research is necessary, it limits the potential
research by forcing it to be related to “licensing and related regulatory
functions.”78
Id. at §§ 202-05.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at § 202.
76
Id. at § 205.
77
Id. at § 205(b)(2).
78
Id.
72
73
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The remaining two divisions of the NRC both deal specifically
with managing nuclear waste. One of these divisions is the Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.79 This office handles the
principal licensing and regulation of all processing, transportation, and
handling of nuclear materials.80 This office also oversees the protection of
nuclear material to prevent sabotage or theft.81 The Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation also manages nuclear waste.82 The Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation is responsible for licensing the construction and
operation of facilities to house nuclear reactors.83 Further, the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation is responsible for reviewing the safety and
safeguards of reactors, including evaluating methods of transporting and
storing high-level radioactive waste to prevent hazards to employees and
the general public when storing the waste at a reactor site.84
While this legislation gave the NRC the full discretion to establish
any oversight and regulation it felt necessary, no legislation was ever
passed to establish specific requirements of these programs or
Id. at § 204.
Id. at § 204(b)(1).
81
Id.
82
Id. at § 203.
83
Id. at § 203(b)(1).
84
Id. at § 203(b)(2)(B).
79
80

90

punishments for facilities failing to meet the programs’ requirements.
However, legislation after the creation of the NRC did detail the
requirements for high-level radioactive waste storage facilities.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 set the standard for how
nuclear waste in the United States ought to be handled.85 Much of the Act
was designed to approve and develop a high-level radioactive waste
repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.86 The process included the
submission of environmental impact statements regarding storage at
Yucca Mountain,87 providing financial assistance to Nevada for
development,88 and planning for the phase-out of all high-level nuclear
waste sites other than Yucca Mountain.89 The official construction license
application for a repository at Yucca Mountain was not filed until 2008.90
The Act also developed the Interim Storage Program.91 The
purpose of this program was to provide for the storage of spent high-level

42 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).
Id.
87
NRC, supra note 68 at § 114(f).
88
Id. at § 116(c).
89
Id. at § 160.
90
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, Repository Development (last visited Apr. 10, 2016)
http://www.nei.org/issues-policy/nuclear-waste-management/disposal.
91
NRC, supra note 68, at § 131.
85
86

91

radioactive waste at facilities owned by the Federal Government. 92 The
Act specifically identifies civilian nuclear power reactors as being proper
storage locations, and requires the NRC to develop procedures for
licensing these locations as storage sites.93 States that house facilities
selected to serve as interim storage facilities have the opportunity to
participate throughout all parts of the process of developing the site.94 If
the federal government attempts to store more than 300 metric tons of
waste at any one site, the corresponding state has the opportunity to file a
Notice of Disapproval before Congress.95 Interestingly, there does not
seem to be any section allowing a state to choose not to go through with
the resolution process and simply refuse the construction of the storage
facility. Perhaps this is because this provision of the Act is designed to
create temporary storage, while the waste waits to be sent to Yucca
Mountain—the selected permanent high-level nuclear waste storage site.96
In 2010, President Barack Obama stopped the Yucca Mountain
license review and instead empaneled a study to create a better long-term
Id.
Id. at § 133.
94
Id. at § 135(d).
95
Id. at § 125(d)(6)(B).
96
Id. at § 133.
92
93

92

storage system.97 While research and strategies have been developed on
how to handle high-level nuclear waste,98 nothing has yet been
implemented. This decision has effectively turned what were once
temporary storage facilities into permanent storage.
VI. COMMENT: SOLUTION
North County St. Louis is just one example of recent incidents
where groundwater has been contaminated by nuclear radiation. On
February 6, 2016, the Indian Point Nuclear Facility in New York reported
a leak of tritium-contaminated water that reached the groundwater around
the facility.99 From that leak, one monitoring well reported a 65,000%
increase in radioactivity.100 Indian Point Nuclear Facility is one of many
reactors that have had incidents of radiation leaks in the past decade due to
onsite storage of nuclear waste or spent nuclear fuel.101 The United States
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, supra at note 90.
U.S.DEP’T OF ENERGY, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 2 (Jan. 2013),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Strategy%20for%20the%20Management%20and%20Di
sposal%20of%20Used%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20and%20High%20Level%20Radioactive
%20Waste.pdf.
99
Andrew M. Cuomo, Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo Regarding Indian
Point Nuclear Facility, NEW YORK STATE (Feb. 6, 2016)
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/statement-governor-andrew-m-cuomo-regardingindian-point-nuclear-facility.
100
Id.
101
See Jennifer Hoar, Tenn. Nuke Accident Hidden from Public, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21,
97
98

93

is in dire need of a new system of monitoring these facilities containing
nuclear waste. The solution to this problem comes in three steps: (1) create
interim storage sites for nuclear waste; (2) open Yukka Mountain and
begin looking for other geological deposits; and (3) increase the NRC’s
oversight of nuclear waste storage sites.
A.

Step One: Create Interim Storage Sites

Currently, the majority of spent nuclear fuel is stored onsite at
nuclear reactor facilities.102
Storage at these facilities has been improving in recent years,
leading to the development of sophisticated systems of storage of spent
nuclear fuel in water-filled pools.103 However, space at nuclear reactor
facilities is limited and growing scarce as more spent nuclear fuel is
developed at those reactor sites.104 The cost of such storage is, in part,
passed along to the users of nuclear electricity at a tenth of one cent per

2007). http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tenn-nuke-accident-hidden-from-public/; see also
Michael Hawthorn, Exelon to Pay $1 Million to Settle Suits Over Leaks at Power Plants,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 12, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-0312/business/ct-biz-0312-exelon-leak-settlement-20100312_1_exelon-nuclear-tritiumleaks.
102
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, supra note 90.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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kilowatt hour used.105 The rest of the cost is borne by United States
taxpayers after the United States failed to remove waste from temporary
reactor storage facilities in 1998, causing many of those facilities to seek
damages from the United States, as well as further compensation.106
Compensation for those facilities has already accumulated a cost of nearly
2 billion dollars, and is anticipated to reach 20 billion dollars by 2020. 107
Due to the limited space and cost of onsite storage, the Nuclear Energy
Institute recommends the creation of locations outside of nuclear reactors
to store the spent nuclear fuel.108
The Nuclear Energy Institute is not the only organization vying for
the creation of offsite storage. In 2013, the United States Department of
Energy made a number of recommendations for handling the disposal of
used nuclear fuel and waste.109 One of the highlighted points of these
recommendations was the creation of “consent-based interim storage

Eugene Voiland, Disposal of High Level Nuclear Waste, CENTER FOR REACTOR
INFORMATION (May 2002),
http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0205voiland.html.
106
Hoar, supra note 101.
107
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, supra note 90.
108
Id.
109
Id.
105
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facilities.”110 These facilities would be created via an agreement with the
federal government.111 The federal government would make agreements
with the host communities and landowners for when the waste would be
removed from their community and how their community would be
compensated for storage of the waste.112 These consent-based interim
storage facilities, as their name suggests, would be temporary solutions
until the federal government created consolidated interim storage facilities
with greater storage capacity as well as more opportunity for disposal. 113
Unfortunately, there is a legislative roadblock in the way of opening such
interim storage sites.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments Act of 1987
(“NWPA”) added a number of sections defining the selection and
construction of storage sites. Under the NWPA, the selection of a
temporary storage site (identified in the statute as “monitored retrievable
storage”)114 is not allowed until a repository has been selected and sent to

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
42 U.S.C. § 10161 (2012).
110
111

96

the president for approval.115 While other sites have been examined,116 the
only repository being considered by the federal government is the Yucca
Mountain geological repository. In order to proceed with the construction
of these interim storage facilities, Yucca Mountain must be approved and
licensed.
B.

Step Two: Open Yucca Mountain

The Yucca Mountain repository’s construction was prevented in
2010 when President Barack Obama halted the licensing review of the
storage

site.117

The

Obama

Administration

called

for

further

environmental research to be conducted into the viability of the site.118
The NRC was called on to create a supplement to the environmental
impact statement prepared by the Department of Energy in regards to the
creation of the Yucca Mountain repository.119 The NRC published its
supplement in November 2015, finding that any environmental impact
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from the creation of the site would be small.120 While this most recent
report, like those before it, suggests Yucca Mountain is a valid site for a
waste storage facility, no further developments have been made on the
construction of the site.
Despite these studies, opponents of the Yucca Mountain site
continue to deny the site’s viability. Nevada argues that the Yucca
Mountain site is unsuitable for nuclear waste storage.121 The state argues
that storing nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain is a dangerous proposition
because of the possibility of earthquakes and volcanism,122 as Yucca
Mountain is located in a volcanic tuff and lies above a large volcanic
aquifer in Death Valley.123 However, the Department of Energy has
identified the chances of volcanic activity affecting the repository to be
nonexistent.124 The Nuclear Energy Institute also points out that
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earthquakes decrease in impact further underground.125 The Yucca
Mountain repository will be 1,000 feet underground in a block designed to
withstand severe earthquakes.126
Other opponents argue that there is evidence of groundwater
upwelling at Yucca Mountain, which could lead to the waste
contaminating groundwater or even causing explosions.127 In combating
this line of argument, the Nuclear Energy Institute researched the
groundwater basin below Yucca Mountain and found that “[t]he fraction
of an inch of water that seeps through fractures in the rock eventually
reaches a groundwater basin beneath the mountain that is completely
close[ed].” This water does not flow to any river or ocean or to the
aquifers that provide a major source of drinking water.128 Further
disproving the upwelling argument, the National Academy of Sciences,
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University of Nevada at Las Vegas, Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board, and United States Geological Survey have all studied the
possibility of upwelling and have concluded that upwelling has never
occurred at the Yucca Mountain site.129
Every formal study by the Department of Energy or the NRC
relating to Yucca Mountain has come back approving of the repositories
safety and viability as a repository for spent nuclear fuel.130 Beyond that,
the most recent statute regarding the development of a candidate site for a
repository identifies Yucca Mountain as the only viable location.131 Any
further delay only increases the chances of yet another environmental
catastrophe from storing nuclear waste onsite at nuclear reactors. In order
to further the country’s nuclear safety, it is critical that the United States
Federal Government approve the use of Yucca Mountain. After approving
Yucca Mountain, the government will be able to construct the interim
storage facilities and transport waste from the waste’s current,
Id.
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decentralized locations. If the government adheres to the Department of
Energy’s strategy for the development of a geologic repository, Yucca
Mountain would be set to open by 2048;132 thus, allowing the government
to move waste from the interim storage to permanent storage where it
cannot do any harm to the public. However, all of these changes will
require a drastic shift in the regulation of nuclear waste.
C.

STEP THREE: EXPANDING REGULATION

As discussed in the Legal Background section above, the NRC has
a significant oversight program for inspecting reactor sites. 133 Regional
inspectors perform between 10 and 25 inspections per year, focusing on
areas such as fire protection, emergency planning, radiation protection,
equipment testing, and134 spent fuel storage.135 However, there is no direct
oversight program for inspecting high-level or low-level radioactive waste
storage facilities.
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This lack of clear oversight procedures for nuclear waste storage is
severely problematic in light of regulations requiring NRC inspections.136
The regulation repeatedly references licensees as being subject to
oversight by the NRC137 Specifically, the regulation identifies “A license
issued under the regulations in parts . . . 61, [and] 63 . . . of this chapter,”
as being subject to the demands of the NRC.138 Sections 61 and 63
specifically identify land disposal of radioactive waste and disposal at
Yucca Mountain.139 Thus, implying that the NRC has a duty to inspect
waste storage sites just as they inspect reactors. To abide by this
regulation, the NRC will need to expand its oversight programs.
Luckily, by creating centralized interim storage locations, as well
as opening Yucca Mountain, the number of locations requiring inspection
will drastically decrease. Rather than having storage across multiple
reactors in 34 separate states,140 the United States could limit the number
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to just those locations selected for interim or permanent waste storage. The
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards could take on this
additional oversight program to ensure the safety of these storage
locations. Unfortunately, President Obama called for a major decrease in
funding to the NRC, which may make this added oversight implausible.141
VII. CONCLUSION
The woes of North County St. Louis seem never-ending. In
December 2015, the Army Corps of Engineers identified seven more sites
along Clear Water Creek, the creek believed to have been contaminated by
Mallinkrodt, which are considered “waste hot spots.”142 Additionally, fire
officials have identified an underground fire that is getting dangerously
close to yet more radioactive waste stored near the West Lake Landfill in
Bridgeton.143 While the cleanup of the contamination in North County
continues, the need for change concerning nuclear waste and spent nuclear
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fuel storage grows ever more pressing. The lack of clear oversight of highlevel radioactive waste storage outside of reactor facilities, the perpetuity
of the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel on reactor sites, and the
seeming halt to the construction of any consolidated nuclear storage site
are all contributing to the broken nuclear waste policy.
However, there are clear solutions. After numerous research
efforts, Yucca Mountain has been determined to be a viable permanent
storage location. Approving further construction at Yucca Mountain to
eventually open it as a permanent geologic repository for nuclear waste is
a critical element of the solution to the United States’ waste storage
problems. Opening Yucca Mountain will take many years, making it
necessary to open interim storage facilities in safe locations with the
approval of the surrounding communities. These first two steps would
greatly decrease the strain on the NRC’s oversight team, allowing them to
only examine a limited number of interim storage facilities and Yucca
Mountain. These interim facilities allow the NRC to combine the storage
of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, stretching the
NRC’s strict spent nuclear fuel oversight program to waste storage as well.
These may seem like drastic steps, but the severity of the impact pales in
104

comparison to the steps being taken in North County St. Louis, which are
a direct consequence of not acting sooner.
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